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Abstract
This papers consists of two parts. The first is a critical review of prior art on adversarial learning, identifying
some significant limitations of previous works. The second part is an experimental study considering adversarial
active learning and an investigation of the efficacy of a mixed sample selection strategy for combating an adversary
who attempts to disrupt the classifier learning.
Index Terms
adversarial learning, active learning, reverse engineering a classifier, sample selection, mixed strategy
I. INTRODUCTION
While there is still skepticism concerning the value of machine learning (ML) for network security
[22], there has been growing interest in the “dual” problem of investigating the security of ML systems,
as applied both to security-sensitive applications (network intrusion detection systems (NIDS), biometric
authentication, email), as well as more generally (image, character, and speech recognition, document
classification), e.g. [12], [9], [14]. Much of the focus is on attempting to degrade or foil supervised
classifiers, as well as anomaly detectors (ADs). [9], [12] provide a useful taxonomy for various attacks
on classifiers, including whether they affect training (what we will call tampering) or just testing/use
(foiling). Moreover, if the attack is on training, one can distinguish attacks that involve mislabeling from
those that add correctly labeled examples, but ones with contrived features chosen to bias learning.
[9] demonstrated naive Bayes spam filters can easily be degraded by labeled spam examples (from
known spam sources) which use many tokens that commonly appear in normal (ham) email (an “indis-
criminate dictionary attack”). This attack on training destroys discrimination power of most tokens in the
“dictionary”. Huge false positive rates ensued when as little as 5% of training data consisted of these
contrived emails. [12] considered active learning (AL), a promising framework for security applications,
as the classifier can adapt to track evolving threats and also because oracle labeling may discover novel
classes [18], [19] that may be zero-day threats. [12] demonstrated, using SVMs, that if an adversary “salts”
the unlabeled data batch in a biased fashion near the current decision boundary (where AL seeks to choose
samples for labeling), one can induce classifier degradation – each adversarial sample was chosen such
that, if labeled, it will decrease accuracy the most. We will discuss in the sequel that the approach in [12]
appears to rely on (oracle) mislabeling, even though frequent mislabeling is not too realistic in practice.
We will also demonstrate experimentally that such mislabeling is not necessary in order for the attacker
to degrade classification accuracy.
This research is supported in part by a Cisco Systems URP gift and AFOSR DDDAS grant.
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[14] considers classifier testing/operation, constructing examples that will be classified differently by a
classifier than by a human being. This is an attack, e.g. in the context of human and autonomous drivers,
where one sees a STOP sign and the other does not, or in future man-machine interactions where robot
servants may misunderstand their master’s commands. [14] showed that one could make relatively small
perturbations to images of digits (presumably below human visual detectability, although we discuss this
further in the sequel) that alter a deep neural net’s decision. Effectively, [14] minimally “pushes” patterns
across the decision boundary. While not recognized in [14], their perturbation approach is related to
boundary-finding algorithms (neural network inversion) [7], [4]. Foiling has also been performed in other
domains, e.g. against detecting malware in PDF documents: synthetic “mimicry” attacks [21], [23] or
natural documents with embedded malware [11] (“reverse” mimicry, as a trojan).
In the related study [3], the attacker generates “obfuscated” voice commands typically perceived as
background noise by any human being who happens to be listening, but which are recognized as valid
commands by a speech recognition system. Such commands could be used e.g. for financial fraud or to
perpetrate a terrorist attack (controlling a crane, a train, etc.). To defend against this, they suggest, e.g.:
a challenge (e.g. CAPTCHA, reactive two-factor authentication); supervised (speaker-dependent) training
to recognize only authorized individuals; password1, speaker/voice authentication, or some other kind of
proactive two-factor authentication; training a classifier to discriminate between computer-generated ob-
fuscated commands and nominal human commands; increasing command specificity. Also, disadvantages
of these defenses are discussed, e.g. latency and additional human effort associated with e.g. a CAPTCHA
for each utterance2.
Regarding the latter defenses, the idea is to reduce the allowed variation of utterances classified to
each word. Thus, effectively, an “unrecognized” (anomalous) class surrounds each word in feature (e.g.
cepstral or wavelet coefficient) space. Note that such AD in speech recognition is not new, e.g. [1], [2].
Also, iPhone’s Siri voice interface added “individualized speech” (voice/speaker) recognition in 2015 [17]
(before [3] but, again, this is very old technology, and easily configured upon purchase of the phone).
Still, the threats posed by the attacks like [3] need to be addressed3. Supervised learning to discriminate
the attack from “valid” speech, which assumes either that labeled examples of the attack (and a sufficient
number of these) have been captured or that the attack strategy is known (so that labeled examples can
be synthesized) may not be realistic4. Alternatively, we will advocate for an AD defense, which requires
neither detailed knowledge of the attack nor (up front) labeled examples of same.
All of the above research works purport to demonstrate “security holes” in ML techniques. These
examples are provocative and they motivate further research. However, these studies also make convenient
assumptions, e.g. about the attacker’s knowledge, which may be grossly unrealistic. Moreover, these studies
ignore existing ML techniques that are much more resilient to adversaries, even without considering explicit
(and well known) defenses, which may detect (and thus foil) the attack. We next identify key limitations
of some prior adversarial learning works.
Unknown Classes and Authentication: [9], [12], [14] assume each pattern must be classified to one
of a known set of categories. In many systems, in fact, there is an augmented class space with an
“unknown” (unrecognized) category. Patterns not confidently assigned to any known category may be
assigned “unknown” – the attack examples in [14] could be assigned thus5. Moreover, in an AL setting,
human oracles who cannot confidently classify selected samples may reject the sample (and thus the
1Recently, a child used Amazon Echo to place an order - the parents had not set up controls (a password) to prevent this [6].
2This is completely reasonable in some cases (e.g. accessing bank accounts or entering passwords), but may be considered very inconvenient
in others (e.g. casual web surfing).
3As do other security concerns involving Siri, e.g. [5], though it is not clear that one could use Siri to input data into web pages via Safari
on the iPhone.
4The attacker may have great degrees of freedom he can apply to create inobtrusive examples – it may be both difficult and impractical
to try to create representative supervising examples “covering” all of these possibilities.
5For example, Siri responds “don’t know” to speech it does not recognize as an english word, where every english word (or word-tense
combination) here corresponds to a known category Siri has been trained to recognize.
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attack). Likewise, emails that are part of an indiscriminate dictionary attack could easily be detected as
anomalous even relative to the existing “spam” class, could thus be labeled as “unknown”, rather than
“spam”, and then would not be used to help learn (i.e. corrupt) the “spam” model. Also, particularly in
IDS settings with unknown unknowns, the full complement of classes is a priori unknown and one may
discover new classes in an unlabeled or semisupervised data batch [13]. This is especially true in an
AL context, starting from few labeled examples [18]. Finally, many security applications in fact involve
authentication, not classification per se – [14], [3] assume the problem is classification. The difference
between these problems is well-known – the latter assumes that a datum originates from one of the N
known classes whereas the former allows for the possibility that the datum is not associated with a known
class – assignment to the “unknown unknown” class amounts to AD. As an obvious example, consider
a perimeter authenticator (access controller) based on a challenge for a userid and password; here the
number of correct responses (N authorized individuals) is miniscule compared to the total number of
possible inputs, the vast majority of which result in failed access. Moreover, authentication (at least to
enter the perimeter) may require an exact (password) match for access. This is essentially an extreme
example of giving emphasis to class specificity. Biometric based challenges (with well-known “replay
attack” protections) can be used instead to explore usability/security trade-offs, or to further secure access
based on passwords.
Unrealistic Assumptions: [9], [14], and [3] assume the classifier, both its structure and its learned
parameters, are known to the attacker. [12] further assumes that the true joint (feature vector, class)
distribution is also known to the attacker. Knowledge of this distribution is usually the “holy grail” in ML
(i.e. it is never assumed known) – given it, one can form the Bayes-optimal classifier. In practice, at best,
one can only imperfectly estimate this joint distribution, given a finite training set. So this latter assumption
is wholly unrealistic even for an inside attacker. Even ignoring this latter assumption, the former one – full
knowledge of the classifier – is really only reasonable under two cases: 1) a non-security setting, where
public-domain classifiers might be used; 2) in a “security” setting, if the attacker is in fact an insider,
e.g. if they work for the company that designed the classifier. Otherwise, in e.g. biometric authentication,
where one seeks to gain access to sensitive or restricted resources, there is zero incentive to publicize many
details of the authentication system. [12] further assumes that the classifier is precisely known after every
round of AL oracle labeling. Note that such knowledge might only be obtainable by intensive probing of
the system (to “relearn” the decision boundary) in between active labelings. Such probing may be very
resource-intensive and must complete within the limited time window between labelings. Moreover, [12]
considers just a 2-D example. The number of probes needed to accurately learn the decision boundary
will grow with the feature dimensionality – consider, e.g. document or image domains, where one may
easily work with tens to hundreds of thousands of features.
Asymmetry: “Straw Man” vs. A Robust System: While [9], [12] discuss possible defenses, the example
attacks in [9], [12], [14] are on completely defenseless systems, as well as inherently vulnerable ones.
Even without explicitly building defenses, there are ML techniques that are widely used and which also
(as a side benefit) make the system robust to exploits. Consider the naive Bayes (NB) spam filter attacks
[9], including the “indiscriminate dictionary” attack and the red herring attack, applicable both to email
and to NIDS. Here, spurious tokens are introduced into samples that come from a known spam source
(e.g. an email address recognized as a source for spam). Once the NB classifier “takes the bait” and
adapts its classifier to focus on these (apparently) discriminating tokens, subsequent spam emails (from
various addresses) omit these tokens and thus avoid detection. The reason such attacks are successful is
because NB is a weak classifier, building only a single model to represent a spam class that may (in a
time-varying fashion) exhibit great diversity – i.e. NB effectively puts all its eggs in one basket. Suppose,
rather than a single NB model, that one uses a mixture of NB models, with new mixture components
introduced in a time-varying fashion, as needed, to well-model patterns that are not well-fit by the existing
model. Such a mixture can capture and isolate a red herring attack within a single (new) NB component.
Thus, the main (legitimate) NB components representing the spam class will not be corrupted by the
attack. Moreover, once the attack is over, the probability mass of this component will dwindle and this
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component can eventually be removed. Thus, we suggest a dynamic mixture, responsive to attacks (as
well as time-varying classes), which should be highly robust to red herring and indiscriminate dictionary
attacks. Other ML techniques that may help achieve attack robustness include e.g. ensemble classification
– here, uncompromised classifiers may compensate for compromised ones, helping to achieve robust
decisions via ensemble decision fusion.
The attacks in [12], [14] could likely be defeated by relatively simple AD defenses. For example, the
AL attack in [12] “tricks” the classifier to select for labeling biased, attacker-generated samples near the
current decision boundary. To maximize the success of the attack, these synthetic examples should be
chosen for active labeling with high prevalence. Moreover, as elaborated in the next section, this attack
appears to rely on the assumption that the oracle may mislabel samples near the true (optimal) decision
boundary. As demonstrated in the next section: 1) a successful attack does not require oracle mislabeling;
2) irrespective of whether there is such mislabeling, attacks can be defeated by using a mixed strategy for
AL sample selection (not always selecting the sample nearest the current decision boundary), and with
no significant loss in the efficiency and accuracy of classifier learning.
Likewise, [14] effectively assumes that if the number of altered features (image pixels, for character
recognition) is below a fixed threshold, the attack will not be detectable by a human being. First, this is
questionable, as the resulting salt and pepper noise is quite visible (see Fig. 1 in [14]) and is not typical of
the original (clean) images in the database6. Second, whether or not the attack is perceptible to a human,
it may be easily detected by an AD defense. Peculiarly, [14] limits the number of features (pixels) one is
allowed to alter. In so doing, to induce a classification error, the magnitudes of the perturbations of the
chosen features must be substantial7. Accordingly, an AD may easily detect salt and pepper noise pixels
as anomalous, relative to intensity values of pixels in a surrounding local spatial neighborhood. Finally,
we note that if a human and machine do disagree on an example – but if they can share their decisions
– then the introduction of these “attack” examples becomes an opportunity – to actively learn – so as to
rectify the machine’s decision on such examples8.
Tampering Power: In [9], while the authors limit the power of the attacker to corrupt training data
(5% of email training data), it is unclear that this level of tampering power is plausible/corresponds to a
realistic scenario. In principle, if the attacker is an insider, she may have unlimited capability to corrupt
training data, in which case there may be no adequate defense. Otherwise, the chosen power of the
attack may intricately depend on knowledge of the particular defense system in play, i.e. on the attacker’s
tradeoff between achieving high attack potency and minimizing the probability of the attack’s detection
and thwarting. Even if only a few training samples are altered, this tradeoff may exist. For example,
in [25], tampering with a single support vector is show to dramatically degrade classification accuracy.
However, to achieve such effect, the tampered sample may become an extreme outlier of its class, and
thus may either be ignored (via use of margin slackness) or may be detectable as a suspicious sample.
Reverse Engineering: [14] (strongly) assumed that the classifier structure and its parameter values are
known to the attacker. Recent works [24], [15] have proposed techniques to reverse-engineer a (black
box) classifier without necessarily even knowing its structure. In [24], the authors consider black box
machine learning services, offered by companies such as Google, where, for a given (presumably big
data, big model) domain, a user pays for class decisions on individual samples (queries) submitted to
the ML service. [24] demonstrates that, with a relatively modest number of queries (perhaps as many
as ten thousand or more), one can learn a classifier on the given domain that closely mimics the black
box ML service decisions. Once the black box has been reverse-engineered, the attacker need no longer
6Human subject testing was used in [14]. However, the authors did not ask respondents whether they thought images had been tampered
with –they only asked them to classify the images.
7Even though the authors impose the minimum norm perturbations needed to induce classification errors (note again that the introduced
salt and pepper noise is quite visible).
8This assumes that the human is more accurate than the machine. In some application domains, this is certainly the case. In domains
where this is not the case, such disagreement may by the same token (appropriately) cause the human to reconsider their judgement.
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subscribe to the ML service. One weakness of [24] is that it neither considers very large (feature space)
classification domains nor very large networks (deep neural networks (DNNs)) – orders of magnitude
more queries may be needed to reverse-engineer a DNN on a large-scale domain. However, a much more
critical weakness of of [24] stems from one of its (purported) greatest advantages – the authors tout that
their reverse-engineering does not require any labeled training samples from the domain9. In fact, in [24],
the attacker’s queries to the black box are randomly drawn, e.g. uniformly, over the given feature space.
While such random querying is demonstrated to achieve reverse-engineering, what was not recognized
in [24] is that this random queryinig makes the attack easily detectable by the ML service – randomly
selected query patterns will typically look nothing like legitimate examples from any of the classes –
they are very likely to be extreme outliers, of all the classes. Each such query is thus individually highly
suspicious by itself – thus, even tens, let alone thousands of such queries will be trivially detected as
jointly improbable under a null distribution (estimable from the training set defined over all the classes
from the domain). Even if the attacker employed bots, each of which makes a small number of queries
(even as few as ten), each bot’s random queries should be easily detected as anomalous, likely associated
with a reverse-engineering attack.
We next perform an experimental study involving adversarial active learning.
II. ACTIVE LEARNING EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In [12], as noted earlier, the attacker can perfectly estimate the current decision rule after every AL
round (may require lots of probing between rounds) and knows the true joint density on the feature
vector and class label p(Y,X) (wholly unrealistic). It was furthered assumed that the attacker knows
the AL sample selection strategy (uncertainty sampling) and injects one new (high decision uncertainty)
sample into the unlabeled batch at each AL round, crafted so that it will be chosen by the oracle for
labeling. Moreover, from the description given in [12], the authors do not assume that the oracle labels
the attacker’s sample consistent either with the Bayes-optimal decison rule or randomly, according to the
true class posteriors. That is, in [12], although it is not very clearly stated, the oracle may mislabel the
samples crafted by the attacker. This is crucial to the success of the attack in [12].
In this paper, we propose a more realistic framework, under which the attacker still possesses the ability
to degrade classification accuracy even without the unrealistic oracle mislabeling assumption. However,
we also demonstrate that attacks on AL can be defeated by a mixed sample selection strategy, through
which the attacker’s injected samples are not so frequently chosen for oracle labeling. Moreover, this
mixed strategy does not make a significant sacrifice either in classifier accuracy or learning convergence
(number of queries needed to achieve good accuracy). In fact, this strategy is also suitable for defeating
the attack even in the presence of oracle mislabeling (though we focus on more realistic oracle labeling
in the sequel).
A. Preliminaries
As in [12], we assume a two-class problem and use a two-class linear support vector machine. We first
select a (large) (unlabeled) training pool (Tr), then randomly select a relatively small number of samples
from both classes in Tr and assign (ground-truth) class labels to them10. One half of this labeled subset
is used as a labeled training set (Tl) to train the initial SVM classifier. The other half of this labeled
subset is used as a “validation” set (V ), to estimate an approximate class posterior for the SVM, using
the approach described in [16]. The (large) remainder in Tr is taken as the pool of unlabeled samples
available to the active learner (Tu), from which the active learner selects for Oracle labeling (and into
9For certain sensitive domains, or ones where obtaining real examples is expensive, the user may in fact have no realistic means of
obtaining a significant number of real data examples from the domain. This is one main reason why the ML service is needed in the first
place – the company or its client for this domain are the (exclusive) owners of this (labeled, precious) data resource.
10For our synthetic data experiment, consistent with the ground-truth class distributions from [12], these labels are assigned according to
the Bayes-optimal rule. For our real-world digits experiment, we use the labels provided with the given data set.
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which the attacker inserts adversarial samples). In addition, there is a labeled test set to evaluate classifier
accuracy.
B. Sample Selection Criteria for Active Learning
The active learner selects samples from Tu, one by one, for labeling by the oracle, with the SVM
classifier retrained after each oracle labeling. We investigate the following AL sample selection strategies:
Uncertainty sampling: Uncertainty sampling is the simplest and most commonly used sample selection
strategy [20]. In this strategy, the AL chooses the nearest sample in Tu to the current boundary (the most
uncertain sample).
Max-Expected-Utility (MEU): Sampling to maximize expected utility (classifier gain) [8]. For data
xi ∈ Tu, i∗ = argmaxiU˜i(θ), where
U˜i(θ) = ∑
yi
pθ(yi|xi) 1
N
 ∑
j∈L∪i
pθ+i(yj |xj) +
∑
j∈U\i
∑
yj
pθ(yj |xj)pθ+i(yj |xj)
 . (1)
Here, θ is the current set of class posterior parameters, and θ+i reflects the updated parameters after
adding xi to Tl with its putative label yi. Using Platt probabilistic outputs for SVMs [16], the posterior
probability pθ(yi|xi) is based on a logistic regression approximation to the SVM (hard) decision function.
Finally, N = |Tl|+ |Tu|.
Random sampling: Select from Tu according to a uniform distribution. This sample selection acts as a
baseline.
Mixed strategies: Choose the sample by MEU (or random sampling) with probability p; otherwise by
uncertainty sampling with probability 1− p. Note that a non-zero proportion for uncertainty sampling is
warranted because uncertainty sampling is a very good mechanism for discovering unknown classes that
may be latently present in Tu [18]. At the same time, using uncertainty sampling plays into the hands of
the attacker.
C. The Attacker
We assume the attacker has the same knowledge as the active learner (i.e. the attacker knows Tl, Tu,
and the current SVM classifier boundary). The attacker adds one sample to Tu at each active sample
selection round, chosen as follows: 1) he projects all training pool samples (Tu and Tl) onto the current
decision boundary (hence creating a (rich) candidate pool of high uncertainty samples), as shown in the
figure below; 2) the attacker injects into Tu the candidate from this pool with minimum expected utility,
based on the expected utility objective given above.
Fig. 1: Candidate adversarial samples (green dots on the boundary)
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III. SYNTHETIC DATA EXPERIMENTS
A. Dataset
We first consider the two-dimensional feature space problem from [12]. The data X is generated such
that the class 1 instances have a bivariate normal distribution centered at (2,0), with the class 2 instances
bivariate normal centered at (-2,0); both classes use an isotropic (identity) covariance matrix, and the
classes are equally likely. We generated 105 instances from each of the two classes as Tr initially, from
which we drew 5 samples at random from each class to form Tl, and another 5 samples from each class
to form V . The remaining 190 instances were taken as Tu. We also generated 200 instances from each
class as test set. This dataset is (obviously) not linearly separable. The optimal decision boundary is the
Y axis. Our oracle deterministically assigns labels consistent with this optimal decision boundary.
B. Results
First, we conducted a single experimental trial, for which AL selects samples strictly using uncertainty
sampling; thus, the attacker’s adversarial samples are selected and labeled at each round11. Fig. 2 shows that
the labeled adversarial samples induce a decision function that deviates from the optimal rule (the boundary
becomes tilted from vertical). Hence, the attacker does have the ability to degrade AL classification
accuracy (even without any oracle mislabeling).
(a) initial sampling (b) after 9 queries
Fig. 2: Classifier decision boundary after initial training and after 9 queries without attack (dash lines)
and with attack (solid lines).
In the following experiment, we performed 10 random trials. In each trial, we used the same Tr,
but randomly chose the initial Tl and V from Tr. We computed average performance for different AL
strategies, over these 10 trials.
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show performance both in the presence of and in the absence of the attack, respectively.
Different sample selection strategies show different abilities to defeat the attack, as shown in Fig. 3. We
have the following observations:
• When AL uses strict uncertainty sampling (p = 0), adversarial samples degrade classification accuracy
successfully for the first 15 queries, which is consistent with single-trial results. However, the
fabricated samples the attacker inserts do not degrade performance in the long run. Thus, the attack
effectively only delays convergence to a good decision boundary12. When the current boundary is
very close to the optimal one, if the attacker still adds fabricated samples to the current boundary,
these samples may even be helpful to refine the boundary. As shown in the sequel, however, the
attack is more successful on a real-world, high-dimensional digit recognition domain.
11Note, though, that, unlike [12], the oracle does not perform any mislabeling.
12Mislabeling would likely allow perpetuated accuracy degradation.
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Fig. 3: Average test error performance of different strategies with attack on the synthetic dataset.
Fig. 4: Average test error performance of different strategies without attack on the synthetic dataset.
• Fig. 3 indicates MEU (p = 1) is not substantially affected by adversarial samples (as one would
expect, since the MEU sample selection criterion is the antithesis of the adversary’s sample generation
strategy), and makes the test error decrease the most at the beginning. However, we also noticed that
MEU selects samples in a class-biased fashion (many samples from one class), leading to a biased
active learner after multiple queries. It is also clear from Fig.4 and Fig. 3 that MEU converges to a
suboptimal decision boundary in the long run.
• With the attack present, the mixed strategies shows improved accuracy for increasing p, p ∈ [0.25, 0.75].
Moreover, in the absence of the attack, there is little accuracy difference for different choices of p.
• Note also that the random strategy is robust to the attack, but does not converge to a solution as
accurate as the mixed strategies.
IV. HANDWRITTEN DIGIT EXPERIMENTS
A. Dataset
We used the MNIST dataset, consisting of 28 × 28 pixel grayscale images, learning a linear SVM to
discriminate between the digits “5” and “6”, that is, we have 784 (pixel) features and a two-class problem.
We initially chose 105 “5” digits and 105 “6” digits as Tr and again labeled 5 samples from each class
to form Tl, and 5 samples from each class to form V . The remainder of Tr was taken as Tu. Also, we
randomly chose another (distinct set of) 456 “5” and 462 “6” samples to form a test set. Our oracle is
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assumed to be an SVM trained on the entire data set. Since the entire data set is linearly separable, this
is a plausible choice for the oracle. Note, also, that because the data set is linearly separable, this oracle
assigns ground-truth labels to all original data samples that are chosen for oracle labeling – the oracle
only manufactures labels for the adversarial samples that are selected for labeling (and in this case it does
so objectively, consistent with maximum margin linear separation of the entire data set).
B. Results
As described in II-C, candidate adversarial samples are the projections of all samples in Tl and Tu onto
the current boundary. Some candidates shown in Fig. 5 involve superposition of the two digits – labeling
such samples and subsequent classifier retraining is expected to have a (negative) impact on the classifier
decision boundary.
Fig. 5: Digit projections on the boundary, Oracle labeling (from top to bottom, from left to right): 6, 6,
5, 6
Again, we performed 10 random trials to get the average performance with/without attack in Fig. 6 and
Fig. 7, respectively.
Fig. 6: Average test error performance of different strategies with attack on Digit Dataset.
To summarize the results:
• Using uncertainty sampling (p = 0), AL always selects the attacker’s injected samples, and is the
best strategy without attack, but worst with attack. Note also that the attack much more substantially
delays learning progress for this high-dimensional domain, compared with the 2-D example.
• MEU (p = 1) makes the test error decrease the most at the beginning, but it converges to a suboptimal
decision boundary, both with and without the attack.
• The mixed strategies have a good defensive capability against the attack (by sometimes using MEU),
and they also alleviate the unbalanced selection problem of MEU by sometimes using uncertainty
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Fig. 7: Average test error performance of different strategies without attack on Digit Dataset.
sampling. With the attack, there is monotonically improving performance with p, for p ∈ [0.25, 0.75]
– using the mixed strategy with p = 0.75, Fig. 6 shows the test error has a fast and steady decrease.
All the mixed strategies perform similarly without the attack.
• The random strategy fares well with the attack, but not when the attack is absent.
V. FUTURE WORK
In future work, we will investigate some of the other adversarial learning defenses suggested in our
review section. We may also investigate alternative AL sample selection strategies – e.g., a modification
of the MEU strategy that does not suffer from the biased sampling we observed in our experiments (This
may be achieved by estimating class proportions and modifying the MEU strategy to maximize expected
utility, but while also sampling consistently with these class prior estimates.). Further, we will continue
to study mixed strategies to discover the unknown classes.
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